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INTRODUCTION TO THOMAS S. v. ROBIN Y*

BACKGROUND

In Thomas S. v Robin Y, petitioner sought an order of filiation
and an order of visitation for Ry, a girl who was born in 1981 as
the result of respondent's artificial insemination with petitioner's
sperm.' In planning for Ry's birth, Robin Y and Sandra R., who
are involved in a lesbian relationship, intended to raise Ry as coparents. As the sperm donor, Thomas S., who is a gay man,
agreed that he would have no parental rights or obligations and that
he would make himself known to Ry only if she asked about her
biological origin.3 The parties did not put the terms of their
agreement in writing nor did respondent seek to legally sever
petitioner's parental rights under California law.4
Thomas S. resides in California, while Robin Y, Sandra R. and
their daughters, Cade and Ry, have lived in New York since July
1982.' For the first three years of Ry's life, Thomas S. did not
attempt to see her at all.6 In early 1985, when Ry began asking
about her biological origin, Robin Y and Sandra R. contacted
Thomas S. and arranged for Ry to meet him.7 "Between 1985 and
1991, Thomas S. visited with Robin Y, Sandra R. and the girls
" 157 Misc.2d 858, 599 N.Y.S.2d 377 (Fam.Ct. 1993), rev'd,618 N.Y.S.2d
356 (1st Dep't 1994), leave to appealgrantedNos. M-6440, M-6441, 1995 N.Y.
App. Div. LEXIS 1420 (1st Dep't Feb. 7, 1995).
Id. at 858-59, 599 N.Y.S.2d at 377.
2 Id. at 859, 599 N.Y.S.2d at 378. In 1980, Sandra R. gave birth to a baby
girl, Cade, as a result of her successful insemination with the sperm of Jack K.
Sandra R. and Robin Y. have raised Cade as co-parents and intended to raise
Cade and Ry as siblings.
3Id.
4 Id. (citing CAL. CML CODE § 7005 (West 1983)).
5id.
6 Id. at 866, 599 N.Y.S.2d at 382.
7 Id.at 860-61, 599 N.Y.S.2d at 379.
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several times a year. All contacts between Thomas S. and the girls
were at the complete discretion of Robin Y and Sandra R."8
Thomas S. eventually became disenchanted with this arrangement9
and, in late 1990 or early 1991, he requested visitation with Ry
outside the presence of Robin Y and Sandra R.' 0 When Robin Y
and Sandra R. refused his request, Thomas S. initiated a legal
action to obtain an order of filiation and visitation."
I.

FAMILY COURT

In 1993, the Family Court of the City of New York refused to
grant Thomas S. an order of filiation. 2 While conceding that there
was clear and convincing evidence that Thomas S. is Ry's
biological father, Judge Edward Kaufnann refuted petitioner's
argument that such evidence triggered a mandatory grant of
filiation under section 542 of the Family Court Act.' 3 Alternatively, Judge Kaufmann applied the doctrine of equitable estoppel
to deny a filiation order for Thomas S.14 Judge Kaufmann reasoned that the doctrine "applies to circumstances where the action
or inaction of one party induces reliance by another to his or her
detriment or where the failure of a party to assert a right promptly
has created circumstances rendering inequitable to permit exercise
of the right after a lapse of time."' 5 In estopping Thomas S. from
exercising paternity rights, Judge Kaufmann emphasized that
Thomas S. had not demonstrated any interest in exercising his
rights, as shown by his limited contact with Ry during her early
development.' 6 In fact, Judge Kaufmann characterized Thomas S.

8Id.
9 Judge Edward Kaufnann speculated that Thomas S.'s discovery in 1987
that he is HIV positive motivated him to redefine his role in Ry's life. Id. at 861
n.5, 599 N.Y.S.2d at 379 n.5.
'0Id. at 861, 599 N.Y.S.2d at 379.
"

Id

Id. at 867, 599 N.Y.S.2d at 382.
Id. at 864, 599 N.Y.S.2d at 381.
14Id. at 865, 599 N.Y.S.2d at 381.
32
"

"5Id. (citations omitted).
16 Id.

at 866, 599 N.Y.S.2d at 382.
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as "an outsider attacking [Ry's] family
17
reasons."'

...

for his own selfish

II. APPELLATE DIVISION
In 1994, the Appellate Division of the New York State Supreme
Court, First Department, reversed the family court in a three to two
decision, granting Thomas S. an order of filiation and remanding
the case for a hearing on visitation.' Contrary to the family court,
the First Department reasoned that if paternity has been established
by clear and convincing evidence, then section 542 of the Family
Court Act mandates the entry of an order of filiation. 9 The First
Department criticized the family court's focus on whether a grant
of filiation would destroy the family that Ry had established with
Robin Y, Sandra R. and Cade. 20 The First Department focused
solely on whether Thomas S.'s rights as a biological parent should
be terminated, while it disregarded the potential impact of visitation
and custody on Ry and her family.2 Moreover, the First
Department concluded that "the doctrine [of equitable estoppel] is
more appropriately applied against" Robin Y than against Thomas
S. in this case, because she chose the method of conception and
initiated and fostered a relationship between Ry and Thomas S.22
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Betty Weinberg Ellerin, joined
by Justice Presiding Ernst Rosenberger, affirmed the family court's
decision, "which denied a declaration of paternity to petitioner
sperm donor on the basis of equitable estoppel., 23 She based this
conclusion on the grounds that "the mere existence of a biological
link does not merit constitutional protection ' 24 of a sperm donor's
parental rights. Justice Ellerin reasoned that the equitable estoppel
doctrine applies to this case because the imposition of estoppel

17 Id.
IS Thomas S. v.
'9Id. at 359.
20 Id. at 358-59.
21
22

23
24

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

Robin Y., 618 N.Y.S.2d 356 (1st Dep't 1994).

359.
362.
363 (Ellerin, J., dissenting).
365 (Ellerin, J., dissenting).
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would serve the best interests of the child, 5 emphasizing that "a
declaration of paternity in this case. . . would be only the first step
in ongoing litigation [over visitation] which will inevitably cause
severe traumatic consequences to the child and her family."26
Justice Ellerin also commented that "[t]his case . . . demonstrates
... the inadequacy of current law and litigation as instruments
capable of satisfactorily accommodating the competing desires and
interests of each of the parties involved."27
III. COURT OF APPEALS

On February 7, 1995, the Appellate Division of the New York
State Supreme Court, First Department, granted Robin Y's motion
for leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals.2" The First
Department, however, denied a stay of its declaration of paternity
pending appeal.29
COMMENTARY

Although Thomas S. v Robin Y involves a dispute between a
lesbian couple and a gay man, the core issue is the composition of
a family unit, rather than the parenting abilities of lesbian and gay
people. The following policy review essay by Marc E. Elovitz, staff
counsel for the American Civil Liberties Union-National Lesbian
and Gay Rights Project, presents one perspective on some of the
legal and social concepts addressed in Thomas S. v Robin Y His
essay uses Thomas S. v Robin Y as the context for evaluating
issues that arise when lesbian and gay people attempt to create
families.
Kevin J Hellmann
Executive Articles Editor

21 Id.

at 368 (Ellerin, J., dissenting).

26

Id. (Ellerin, J., dissenting).

27

Id.

28

Thomas S. v. Robin Y., Nos. M-6440, M-6441, 1995 N.Y. App. Div.

at 363 (Ellerin, J., dissenting).

LEXIS 1420 (1st Dep't Feb. 7, 1995).
29 Id.

